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A TEST OF SOVEREIGNTY:
FRANCHISE TAX BOARD
OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
V. GILBERT P. HYATT
TIMOTHY DILL*
INTRODUCTION
In Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt,1 the Supreme Court
considers whether to overrule Nevada v. Hall,2 a 1979 Supreme Court
decision. Hall permitted a State to be haled into the court of another
State without its consent. In 2016, an evenly divided Supreme Court
affirmed Hall 4-4 when faced with the same question, and following a
remand to the Nevada Supreme Court, the Court has granted
certiorari on this question once again.
This Commentary contends that Hall was wrongly decided and
should be overruled. The Constitution’s ratification did not alter the
status of common-law State sovereign immunity, leaving intact not
only State sovereign immunity in a State’s own court but also a State’s
immunity to suits in the courts of another State without consent.
However, this case, in which the Petitioner has already appeared in
the court of another State, is not the appropriate vehicle for
overruling Hall. State sovereign immunity should be restored at the
next possible opportunity, when the issue is properly brought before
the Court.

Copyright © 2019 Timothy Dill.
*J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2020.
1. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 717 (Nev. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct.
2710 (argued Jan. 9, 2019) (No. 17-1299).
2. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
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I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1993, an auditor for the California Franchise Tax Board (FTB),
petitioner in this case, read a newspaper article discussing the
considerable patent income of respondent and inventor Gilbert
Hyatt.3 Reviewing Hyatt’s 1991 return, the auditor found that Hyatt
claimed to have lived in California during the first nine months of
1991 before moving to Nevada, where he spent the remainder of that
year.4 However, the absence of any claimed moving expenses on
Hyatt’s 1991 return caused the FTB to audit Hyatt’s 1991 state
income tax return.5 The audit included more than one hundred letters
and demands for information sent to various individuals and entities,
a request for information and documents from the respondent
directly, interviews with Hyatt’s relatives, and auditor trips to both
Hyatt’s former California neighborhood and Las Vegas, Nevada.6
Although the FTB determined that Hyatt had rented a Nevada
apartment, obtained a Nevada driver’s license, insurance policy, and
bank account, and also registered to vote, the FTB found that Hyatt
had not actually moved to Nevada from California until April 1992.7
The FTB believed that Hyatt developed this elaborate scheme to
avoid California state income tax liability on his patent-licensing
income.8 It assessed $4.5 million in taxes, penalties and interest against
Hyatt for the 1991 tax year,9 as well as $6 million in taxes and interest
for not filing a California return in 1992.10 Hyatt filed protests with the
FTB that would last over a decade.11
While the protests were in progress, Hyatt filed suit against the
FTB in Nevada in 1998 for, inter alia, invasion of privacy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, fraud, breach of confidential
relationship, and negligence.12 Acknowledging, however, that Nevada
v. Hall established that a State court can assert jurisdiction over
another State without that State’s consent,13 California filed two
3. Hyatt, 407 P.3d at 725 (Nev. 2017).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 726.
8. See id. (“FTB further concluded that Hyatt had staged the earlier move to Nevada . . .
in an effort to avoid state income tax liability on his patent licensing.”).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 724.
13. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1280 (2016).
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petitions seeking immunity from the Nevada lawsuit on other
grounds, “arguing that it was entitled to the complete immunity that it
enjoyed under California law based on either sovereign immunity, the
full faith and credit clause, or comity.”14 The Nevada Supreme Court
found that even though these principles did not entitle the FTB to full
immunity, the FTB should receive partial immunity to the same
extent that a Nevada government agency would have received.15 This
partial immunity shielded the FTB from the negligence claim but did
not cover the suit’s intentional tort claims.16
In 2003, the Nevada Supreme Court’s petition rulings granting the
FTB partial immunity were upheld by the United States Supreme
Court.17 At trial, a Nevada jury awarded Hyatt more than $380 million
in damages for emotional distress, invasion of privacy, fraud, and
punitive damages.18 The Nevada Supreme Court on appeal reduced
the FTB’s compensatory damages liability to roughly $1 million19 and
affirmed the judgment for fraud.20 The court declined to apply a
Nevada statutory damages cap for state officials and upheld Hyatt’s
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim while
reversing the IIED damage award.21 The court also reversed the
punitive damage award, affording the FTB the same protection from
punitive damages afforded Nevada government entities.22
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether Nevada
v. Hall should be overruled and determine if the Nevada Supreme
Court erroneously failed to apply Nevada agency statutory
immunities to the Franchise Tax Board.23 The Court affirmed
Nevada’s exercise of jurisdiction over a California state agency 4-4
14. See id. at 727. The Nevada Supreme Court has defined comity as “a legal principle
whereby a forum state may give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state based
in part on deference and respect for the other state, but only so long as the other state’s laws are
not contrary to the policies of the forum state.”). Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d
717, 729.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003)).
18. Id. at 728.
19. See Brief for Respondent at 7, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 717 (Nev.
2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (Nov. 15, 2018) (No. 17-1299) [hereinafter Brief for
Respondent] (“[The Nevada Supreme Court] reduced the Board’s liability for compensatory
damages to $1 million on Hyatt’s fraud claim and remanded the case for a retrial on damages
with respect to Hyatt’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.”).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 8–9.
22. Id. at 9.
23. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1280 (2016).
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and found that the Full Faith and Credit Clause24 barred Nevada from
awarding damages against a California agency greater than could be
awarded against a Nevada agency in similar circumstances under
Nevada law.25
On remand, the Nevada Supreme Court directed the trial court to
apply the Nevada government agency statutory damage cap of
$50,000 to the FTB.26 Finally, two years after its 4-4 affirmance of
Nevada v. Hall, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the same
question in June 2018.27
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The question of a State’s sovereign immunity in the courts of its
fellow States of the union is currently governed by Nevada v. Hall, a
1979 decision affirmed 4-4 by the Supreme Court in 2016.28 In Hall, a
University of Nevada employee collided with a vehicle containing
California residents on a California highway.29 The injured California
residents sued, inter alia, the State of Nevada in California court.30 On
appeal, the California Supreme Court found California law to permit
suit of the State of Nevada in California court.31 After a California
jury awarded the California residents over $1 million in damages and
the California Supreme Court declined review,32 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari33 to address for the first time “whether a State may
claim immunity from suit in the courts of another State.”34 The Court
determined there was no such immunity.35
Nevada did not contend that the California Supreme Court had
incorrectly interpreted California law.36 Instead, Nevada argued that
the Constitution implicitly required States to abide by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity at the time of the Constitution’s ratification.37 The
24. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
25. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. at 1280.
26. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 717 (Nev. 2017),
cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (Sept. 11, 2018) (No. 17-1299) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
27. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 138 S. Ct. 2710.
28. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. at 1280.
29. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 411 (1979).
30. Id. at 411–12.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 413.
33. Nevada v. Hall, 436 U.S. 925.
34. 440 U.S. at 414.
35. See id. at 426.
36. Id. at 418.
37. Id.
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idea that a sovereign could not be sued without consenting, Nevada
claimed, was commonly understood.38 In deciding Hall, the Court
examined both the “source and scope” of sovereign immunity
doctrine, the doctrine’s impact on the Constitution, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, and constitutional limitations of sovereignty.39
A. The Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
The sovereign immunity doctrine combines two concepts, “one
applicable to suits in the sovereign’s own courts and the other to suits
in the courts of another sovereign.”40 The former, originating from the
feudal system, has stood for centuries.41 Once the American colonies
successfully rebelled against the king of England, they became
sovereigns, thus inheriting sovereign immunity.42 Though United
States law has not maintained the British “fiction that the King could
do no wrong,” it has maintained the concept “that immunity from suit
is an attribute of sovereignty.”43 The latter concept, immunity in the
courts of another sovereign, is less clear.
The Constitution’s drafters did not discuss whether comity would
shield a State from being haled into the court of a fellow State
without consent.44 Although this may have been because the Framers
assumed that comity would prevent the States from attempting to
hale one another into court,45 that assumption has not proven true.
Instead, the States were “vitally interested” in potential liability in the
new federal courts.46 Thus, the Supreme Court’s 1793 finding in
Chisholm v. Georgia47 that States could be sued in federal court
swiftly led to the passage of the Eleventh Amendment, limiting
federal court power to hear suits against the States.48 Yet the Eleventh

38. Id. at 414.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Brief of Indiana and 43 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3,
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (Sept. 18, 2018) (No. 17-1299), 2018 WL
4583704 at *3 [hereinafter Brief of Indiana].
43. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 421–22.
44. Id. at 419.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 418.
47. See 2 U.S. 419, 452 (1793) (“[I]f sovereignty be an exemption from suit in any other
than the sovereign’s own Courts, it follows that when a State, by adopting the Constitution, has
agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of the United States, she has, in that respect, given
up her right of sovereignty.”).
48. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 420.
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Amendment does not grant the federal judiciary the power to enforce
interstate comity.49
B. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
The Full Faith and Credit Clause “require[s] each State to give
effect to official acts of other States.”50 It sometimes requires one
State’s court to apply another State’s statutory law, but not where
doing so would violate the former’s “own legitimate public policy.”51
The Hall court found that denying California jurisdiction “would be
obnoxious to [California’s] statutorily based policies of jurisdiction
over nonresident motorists and full recovery,” declining to interpret
the Full Faith and Credit Clause as requiring such a verdict.52
C. Constitutional Limitations on Sovereignty
Relying on the inability of the States of the Union to tax each
other’s goods, bar entry from one another and deny extradition, as
well as the entitlement of each State’s citizens to the privileges and
immunities of the other States, the Hall Court reasoned that the
United States “is not a union of 50 wholly independent sovereigns.”53
And while the Court noted its past presumption of States’ comity
toward one another, it recognized that a State’s assertion of
jurisdiction over another State clearly contradicted that
presumption.”54
***
Acknowledging the potential wisdom of a system in which States
give each other immunity, the Hall Court declined to infer such a
requirement from the Constitution.55 In fact, the Court held that
denying California the ability to enforce its own policy would be the
true intrusion on State sovereignty.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 421.
Id.
Id. at 421–22.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 425–26.
Id.
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III. HOLDING
The Supreme Court’s 4-4 affirmation of Nevada v. Hall’s State
sovereign immunity precedent prevented the Supreme Court of
Nevada from having to directly reconsider this possible bar to
California liability in Nevada court. On remand of Franchise Tax
Board of California v. Hyatt, the Supreme Court of Nevada referred
to Nevada v. Hall’s holding that a State “can open the doors of its
courts to a private citizen’s lawsuit against another State . . . without
the other State’s consent.”56 Observing that Nevada would “consider”
providing immunity to States brought into Nevada court, the Court
commented that Nevada was not required to do so.57
With Hall’s precedent still firmly in place, the Nevada court
instead addressed more narrow questions of State sovereign
immunity. Examination of these questions would have been obviated
had the Supreme Court overruled Hall. Similarly, the Nevada
Supreme Court’s 2014 Hyatt opinion (preceding the Supreme Court’s
4-4 Hall affirmation) examined the narrower issue of whether Nevada
should extend its statutory discretionary function immunity to
California.58
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Arguments
The FTB contends that Hall was wrongly decided for two
reasons.59 It first argues that since Hall, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that the Hall majority was wrong to seek
Constitutional support for interstate sovereign immunity.60 Rather,
the Court should have examined whether States were immune to suits
in the courts of other States of the Union prior to the Constitution’s
ratification.61 Petitioner relies on Alden v. Maine62 in asserting that
“States continue to enjoy the immunity they possessed before the

56. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 717, 724 (Nev. 2017) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1279–80) (2016).
57. Id. at 729.
58. See generally Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 335 P.3d 125 (Nev. 2014).
59. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 10.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 10–11.
62. 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
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ratification of the Constitution, unless the Constitution abrogated that
immunity.”63
Petitioner asserts that the historical record clearly shows that
States enjoyed immunity from one another’s courts prior to the
Constitution’s ratification, and the Framers did not intend to abrogate
that immunity.64 The outcry over Chisholm’s allowance of suits against
States in federal courts leads to the logical conclusion that States also
assumed they could not be sued by one another, as the prospect of
trial in a neutral setting would have been far less threatening in
comparison.65
Petitioner argues that The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon,66 an 1812
case holding “[the fact] that a forum nation may choose whether to
recognize another nation’s sovereign immunity in its courts—says
nothing about whether States in a federal union are required to
recognize each other’s sovereign immunity in their courts,” highlights
the absence of a governing authority capable of forcing nations to
provide each other sovereign immunity.67 This is not the case
regarding disputes between member States of the United States,
Petitioner contends, as the Constitution endowed the Supreme Court
with the power to force members of the United States to respect one
another’s sovereign immunity.68
Second, Petitioner argues that Hall “gave little consideration to
the constitutional values that are protected by sovereign immunity.”69
These include States’ dignitary interests and State citizens’ interests in
self-government.70 Petitioner points to the present case, still in
litigation more than twenty years after its 1998 filing71 and one in
which a Nevada court has intruded on “California’s conduct of one of

63. Id. at 17.
64. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 11 (“The historical record shows beyond
doubt that the States did enjoy immunity in each other’s courts in the pre-ratification era and
that the Framers had no intention of abrogating that immunity.”).
65. See id. (“That understanding was confirmed by the outraged reaction to this Court’s
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, allowing States to be sued in the neutral federal courts—a
reaction that would have made little sense had anyone thought States could be sued in the
potentially more hostile courts of other States.”) (citation omitted).
66. 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
67. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 11.
68. Id. at 11–12.
69. Id. at 12.
70. Id.
71. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 717, 726 (Nev. 2017).
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its core sovereign functions,” as a prime example of Hall’s abuse of
these values.72
Petitioner also argues that there are multiple reasons why stare
decisis should not control here.73 First, Hall is not in line with multiple
post-Hall Supreme Court State sovereign immunity holdings.74
Petitioner points to the Court’s statement in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, which advocates the overturn of precedent that has been left
“a mere survivor of obsolete constitutional thinking.”75 In 1993 the
Court stated that Eleventh Amendment “accords the States the
respect owed them as members of the federation,”76 and in 1997 the
Court observed that sovereign immunity protects “the dignity and
respect afforded a State.”77 Therefore, petitioner believes Hall to be
such a “mere survivor.”78
Hall was an outlier even in 1979, permitting States to be haled into
each other’s courts without consent despite their immunity in their
own courts and in federal court.79 Since Hall, the Court has expanded,
rather than contracted, State sovereign immunity, while at the same
time leaving States vulnerable to court systems more likely to be
hostile: those of other States.80 Thus, Petitioner contends, overruling
Hall will not threaten other precedents.81
Petitioner’s second argument against stare decisis is that Hall has
not led to reliance by subsequent parties.82 As, practically speaking,
only the Supreme Court can overturn Constitutional precedent,83

72. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 12 (“This suit—in which a California state
agency has been subjected to astonishing burdens for two decades, and in which a Nevada judge
and jury have passed judgment on California’s conduct of one of its core sovereign functions—
exemplifies why Hall cannot be squared with the values the Court has recognized in later
decisions.”).
73. Id.
74. See id. (“Hall is a poorly reasoned decision that is inconsistent with this Court’s
subsequent precedents in numerous respects.”).
75. Id. at 40 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992)).
76. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).
77. Idaho v. Couer d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997).
78. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 40 (“Hall is also inconsistent with the Court’s
recognition in more recent decisions of the values underlying the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.”).
79. Id. at 40–41.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 43.
82. Id.
83. See id. (“In such cases, only the Court can correct the error of a prior decision, because
‘correction through legislative action is practically impossible.”) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
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stare decisis is weakest when considering the Court’s Constitutional
interpretation.84 Here, no parties have taken specific action assuming
that Hall’s precedent will stand,85 lessening the potential impact of
overturning it.
Finally, Petitioner points to Hall’s harms, using the present case as
an example.86 Sovereign immunity should protect the dignity of States,
particularly regarding taxation.87 Yet here, ten years of litigation
resulted in a State jury awarding a fellow State resident $388 million
in damages at the expense of the taxpayers of another State.88 Any
damage assessed against a State directly diminishes State spending
that would benefit its taxpayers.89 Hyatt has also done the State of
California the indignity of having its conduct reviewed not just by the
judiciary of another State, but by a jury of that State’s citizens.90
Petitioner also points to the fact that this suit is not even the only one
of its type, as California now faces suit in the State of Washington as
well.91 In fact, even Nevada, the very State that exercised jurisdiction
over Petitioner, now seeks for Hall to be overruled.92
B. Respondent’s Arguments
Respondent argues that certiorari should be dismissed for two
reasons. First, Respondent contends that case doctrine controls.93 The
evenly divided Court affirmation of Hall when the question was first
presented constitutes a judgment on the merits.94 Conceding that an
evenly divided court has no precedential value, Respondent says that
it is nonetheless binding on the parties here.95

84. Id.
85. See id. at 43–44 (“Here, by contrast, no parties ‘have acted in conformance with
existing legal rules in order to conduct transactions,’ or have otherwise conducted their lives in a
manner that assumes the continuing vitality of a constitutional precedent.”) (quoting Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010)) (citation omitted)
86. Id. at 44.
87. Id. at 45.
88. Id. at 44.
89. See id. at 45 (“Such damages awards necessarily crowd out ‘other important needs and
worthwhile ends’ that California’s public fisc must fund.”) (quoting Alden v. Maine., 527 U.S.
706, 751 (1999)).
90. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 45.
91. Id.
92. See Brief of Indiana, supra note 43 (listing Nevada as one of the Filing Parties).
93. Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 12.
94. Id. at 13.
95. Id. at 18.
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Chief Justice John Marshall upheld this principle in Etting v.
United States,96 and it appeared again in Durant v. Essex Co.,97 in
which Durant sought a rehearing after the Supreme Court’s tie vote
affirmed the Circuit Court’s ruling.98 The Court held that, where a
court is equally divided on a question of whether to “set aside or
modify an existing judgment or order, the division operates as a denial
of the application, and the judgment, or order, stands in full
force . . . .”99 Respondent also points to Hertz v. Woodman100 and Neil
v. Biggers101 as affirming this principle.102
The law of case doctrine—that a court’s ruling in a case governs
that case’s subsequent stages—allows parties to rely on a court’s
ruling.103 Here, the Nevada Supreme Court has relied on the Supreme
Court’s prior affirmation of Hall in finding that the FTB could indeed
be haled into Nevada court.104 Hyatt himself has relied on the Court’s
prior decisions in this case, which has cost both parties “an enormous
amount of time and money.”105 Overruling Hall would be particularly
unjust, Respondent argues, given that Petitioner chose not to
challenge Hall in the initial litigation.106 Departing from case doctrine
should be done sparingly, such as where the initial decision was clearly
erroneous.107 Here, Hall is certainly not clearly erroneous.108
Second, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s failure to initially
raise this question constituted a waiver of its right to do so.109
Respondent highlights that the FTB did not argue that Hall should be
overruled when this case first reached the Supreme Court.110
Petitioner only raised this question following the Nevada Supreme
Court’s affirmance of “key aspects of liability and damages” on
remand.111 According to Respondent, “[t]he law is clear that if an

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

24 U.S. 59, 78 (1826).
74 U.S. 107 (1869).
Id. at 109 (1869).
Id. at 110.
218 U.S. 205 (1910).
409 U.S. 188 (1972).
Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 20.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)).
Id. at 24.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
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argument is not raised in a petition for certiorari, it is deemed
waived.”112 Even State sovereign immunity can be waived.113
Respondent next lists several reasons to affirm Hall, first noting
the presumption against overruling precedent.114 As the Court
observed in 2006, stare decisis “avoids the instability and unfairness
that accompany disruption of settled legal expectations.”115 The Court
should only depart from stare decisis when there is a “compelling
justification,”116 which the FTB has failed to present here.
Second, Respondent states that Hall protects the States’ Tenth
Amendment power to protect their citizens.117 A State’s desire to
provide a remedy for its injured citizens is legitimate.118 Here, a
Nevada jury clearly found the FTB’s conduct against Hyatt
outrageous, as it awarded nearly $400 million in damages.119 Although
Petitioner speaks of the dignity interest of States, it argues for the
indignity of prohibiting States from protecting their own citizens.120
No State is as interested as Nevada in protecting Nevada citizens.
Upholding Hall would “affirm[] the dignity and autonomy of a State
to be able to determine the jurisdiction of its courts . . . .”121
Hall has not resulted in frequent suits against out-of-state
defendants, and multiple factors already limit liability where such
suits occur. Respondents dismiss Petitioner’s claimed “harms” of Hall
as “a relative handful of suits.”122 It was rare for States to be sued in
the court of another State pre-Hall and remains rare today.123
Furthermore, Respondent argues that Petitioner has made no showing
that the few suits that have occurred lacked merit.124 And even when

112. Id. at 26 (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 n.13 (1996); Tenn. Student
Ass’n Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 456 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
113. Id. at 27 (citing Clark v. Barnard, 18 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)).
114. Id. at 28.
115. Id. (quoting Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006)).
116. Id. at 29 (quoting Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 30 (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 64 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
119. Id.
120. See id. (“The Board speaks of the ‘dignity’ interest of states in not being sued . . . but
fails to recognize the dignity interest of a state in being able as a sovereign to determine the
jurisdiction of its own courts and to protect its own citizens from harm.”) (citing Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 26, at 38).
121. Id. at 32.
122. Id. at 33.
123. Id. at 33.
124. Id. at 49.
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such suits occur, the Full Faith and Credit Clause limits liability to the
amount permitted against the forum State by its own laws.125
Although not required, comity may also play a role. Here, the Nevada
Supreme Court recognized comity in prohibiting punitive damages
against the out-of-state Petitioner.126 And finally, States desiring to not
be vulnerable to suits in one another’s courts are not prohibited from
freely entering into mutual immunity agreements.127
Third, no new historical evidence has been uncovered post-Hall
indicating that the Hall court was wrong. Facing similar facts, the Hall
court found no historical support for State immunity in the court of
another sovereign, relying on Schooner v. McFaddon in holding that
sovereign immunity was not meant to extend so far.128 In the absence
of such a special justification, Hall should stand.129 As Schooner
Exchange “established the power of a state . . . to provide a remedy to
its injured citizens against out-of-staters,” the Court was correct to
rely on it despite Petitioner’s objections that Schooner Exchange dealt
not with State immunity but that of nations.130
The Court correctly based Hall on three premises: the preConstitution States were independent sovereigns immune in each
other’s courts, sovereign nations were only immune in the courts of
another nation with the consent of that nation, and the Constitution
did not disturb that balance. Respondent cites the amicus brief of
Professors Baude and Sachs, arguing that “[t]he Constitution left
sister-state immunity alone.”131 Respondent also cites Petitioner’s
brief, which states that “[n]o State could be required to respect
another’s sovereign immunity” prior to the Constitution’s
ratification.132 Petitioner’s reliance on Alden v. Maine in promulgating
State sovereign immunity is an improperly broad extension.133 Alden
v. Maine shows that States may elect to be immune in their own

125. Id. at 34 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1281 (2016)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 35 (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416 (1979)).
128. Id. at 37–38.
129. See id. at 36 (arguing that Nevada v. Hall was decided on the original understanding
and a careful analysis of historical precedent).
130. Id. at 38–39.
131. Id. at 40 (citing Brief of Professors William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs as Amici
Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 6, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 138 S. Ct. 2710
(Sept. 18, 2018) (No. 17-1299), 2018 WL 4583702 at *6 [hereinafter Sachs Brief]).
132. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 31–32.
133. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 46.
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courts, and Nevada v. Hall adds that States may elect to permit suit of
other States in their own courts.134
V. ANALYSIS
A. Sister-state Sovereign Immunity, provided for in the common law,
was left unaltered by the Constitution
Prior to ratifying the Constitution, the States were sovereigns in
every respect, and could not be forced into the courts of one another
absent consent. The States today should retain sovereign immunity
within their own courts. Petitioner asserts that States today have the
same degree of sovereign immunity as they did pre-Constitutional
ratification,135 and surprisingly the Respondent concedes that the
Constitution “left sister-state immunity alone.”136 The States’ amici
brief cites Alexander Hamilton’s observation: “‘there is no colour to
pretend that the State governments would, by the adoption of [the
Constitution], be divested’ of their immunity.”137 Therefore, assuming
the Constitution did indeed leave sister-state immunity untouched,
States today should enjoy immunity in one another’s courts to the
same extent that they did prior to joining the Union. The preConstitution status of inter-state immunity must therefore be
dispositive.
Professors Baude and Sachs believe that Hall was correct in
finding no constitutional sister-state immunity.138 A guarantee of
sister-state immunity is not found in the Constitution’s plain
language.139 But States retain every power “not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States.”140 The federal government is not empowered to abrogate
sister-state immunity, which still exists in the common law today as it
did prior to the Constitution.

134. Id. at 44.
135. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 10.
136. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 40 (quoting Sachs Brief, supra note 131, at
6) (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Brief of Indiana, supra note 43, at 5 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
138. Sachs Brief, supra note 131, at 2.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 3 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X).
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B. When States choose to allow suit of another State without that
State’s consent, any judgment rendered is unenforceable
As a common-law provision, States are powerless to force other
States to recognize their immunity.141 California cannot control which
suits Nevada decides to bring in Nevada court. California could, of
course, consent to be sued in Nevada, but if Nevada decides to
proceed without that consent, California is powerless to prevent it
from doing so. But a Nevada court’s judgment against California may
be unenforceable absent the respect of a federal court.142 Similarly, if
the United States were to depart from international law in its
assertion of jurisdiction, there would be no guarantee that foreign
nations would recognize a resulting judgment.143 This existing
protection of sister-state immunity may be the reason that the
Constitution did not address the issue.144
Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires States to
recognize judgments of other State courts, the Hall Court’s invocation
of the clause was limited to judgments “issued with ‘jurisdiction over
the parties.’”145 Were the Court to uphold sister-state sovereign
immunity, the Full Faith and Credit Clause would be inapplicable.
Courts today decline to recognize State court judgments where the
court in question lacked the power to render it.146
C. Due to Respondent’s voluntary appearance, Hall should be
overturned at the next opportunity
Respondent had multiple alternative courses of action available to
it in this proceeding. It could have stood its ground and refused to
appear in Nevada court. Had Nevada proceeded to render a judgment

141. See id. at 16 (“Because sovereign immunity is a rule of common law and the law of
nations, a State can abrogate it within its own courts, just as it can abrogate the common-law
rules of coverture, burglary, or respondeat superior.”).
142. See id. (“As nearly a century of history suggests, the original Constitution did not force
state or federal courts to respect the judgment of a court which lacked power over the defendant
under traditional jurisdictional principles. Sister-state immunity was just such a principle. Thus,
a State which tries to abrogate that immunity may find its judgments without effect in other
American courts.”).
143. See id. at 18 (“[B]ut if the United States departs from accepted international practice,
it cannot guarantee that its judgments will continue to be recognized abroad.”).
144. Id. at 17.
145. Id. at 19 (quoting Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421 (1979)).
146. Id. at 21 (citing Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 282–83 (1980) (plurality
opinion); V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1020 (2016); Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222,
240–41 (1998)).
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against the FTB, the FTB could then have chosen to default.147
Alternatively, Respondent “could have filed an original action against
Nevada” in the Supreme Court to obtain a declaration of its
entitlement to immunity in the courts of Nevada.148 As Professors
Baude and Sachs note, the State of Nevada’s participation in an
amicus brief asking for Hall to be overruled may indicate that it
would consent to such an action.149
However, the Court is confronted with a challenge to Hall in
which the aggrieved State has already chosen to appear in sister-state
court. As sister-state immunity consists of an immunity to suit without
consent of the State haled into court, Respondent appears to have
submitted to Nevada’s exercise of jurisdiction, failing to avail itself of
the protection of sister-state immunity.
Due to the above reasons, the Court should not overrule Hall
here, but should do so at the earliest appropriate opportunity to
preserve an aspect of State sovereign immunity that existed before
the Constitution and was not abrogated by it. In dismissing the writ as
improvidently granted, the Court should signal similarly situated
parties that it is prepared to overturn Hall, emboldening States in
future actions to refuse to appear in a sister-state’s court. California’s
apparent waiver of its immunity by appearing in Nevada court is
logical, as it appeared with no expectation that its sovereign immunity
would be respected in the era of the wrongly decided Hall. Were Hall
to be overruled a similarly situated Respondent would indeed waive
its right to suit in the State court of another without its consent by
appearing at the proceeding. Although dismissing the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted will prolong the period in which
States are wrongly forced into the courts of peers without their
consent, that period should be short given the overwhelming number
of States that joined together in filing an amicus brief in support of
overruling Hall. This question will surely reach the Court again
swiftly.

147. See id. at 23 (“States have a number of tools for resisting adverse judgments. The most
obvious strategy is simply to default, as Georgia did in Chisholm, and to resist enforcement later
on.”) (citation omitted).
148. Id. at 24.
149. Id.
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D. Stare decisis is not compelling here
Although Respondent is correct in contending that the current
volume of cases that offend sister-state sovereign immunity is not
practically unworkable, that is not the bar that must be met here. It is
sufficient that a significant State right that endured the first two
hundred years of United States legal history intact was wrongly taken
away in 1979. Even a single case forcing a sovereign State into the
court of a peer is too many. Respondent points to the “almost 40-yearold precedent” of Hall.150 Yet this period pales in comparison to the
much longer precedent period during which State sovereign immunity
was left untouched. Respondent does not see this deprivation of
States’ rights as a compelling reason for overruling Hall. Respondent
also fails to explain what instability and unfairness would be caused
by doing so, while Petitioner has highlighted the lack of reliance
interests present here. Petitioner has also pointed to the anomalous
nature of Hall. Hall created a system in which States are immune both
in their own courts and in federal courts but remain vulnerable in the
courts most likely to be hostile to them: those of their peers.151
Overruling Hall will create a more uniform system.
CONCLUSION
Franchise Tax Board does not present the ideal set of facts on
which to overrule Hall, as Respondent appears to have waived its
immunity by appearing in Nevada court. That does not change the
fact that Hall wrongly stripped States of an important aspect of State
sovereign immunity provided in common law and unaltered by the
Constitution. In doing so, Hall perpetrated an indignity on the United
States’ member States and changed an aspect of the legal landscape
that had stood for two centuries. That right should be returned at the
next opportunity, when a State properly asks a federal court to
enforce its common-law immunity from the courts of a sister State.
Sovereigns should enjoy immunity not only in their own courts, but
also in the courts of their peers.

150. Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 28.
151. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 40.

